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Top-level
 What Jobs et. al. *didn't* ever say (but was later confirmed in court documents) is that the reason the iOS 1.0 homescreen and first party apps weren't web based is that inside Apple, the web had already lost by the late '07 release of the iPhone. There had been parallel tracks, and prototypes of a truly web-based OS, but they didn't launch. Cocoa was already Plan A when Jobs described the web as a "great application platform" at Moscone. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac 8 comments
With the App Store and iOS 2.0, as well as Push Notifications in iOS 3.0 ('09), Apple created a capability gap between it's preferred proprietary platform and the open web. That gap persists to this day, and is a large part of why we talk about Safari leadership as a historical novelty despite Apple's overwhelming capacity to produce a world-beating browser. What keeps them from doing it? Strategic antipithy towards a platform it doesn't own and can't tax. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac It seems likely that the success of the App Store was a surprise even to Apple, but once it took root (thanks in no small part to Push, and later IAP), Apple could fully pivot it's web strategy: the leader doesn't need a bridge; best to burn/deprecate it and dig an ever-deeper moat. This is what Apple has done via its strategic under-investment in WebKit for the past decade. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac Some folks still offer tortured arguments for why Apple is on the side of the angels, but they're transparently nonsense: https://infrequently.org/2022/06/apple-is-not-defending-browser-engine-choice/ Apple, in 2023, keeps it boot on the neck of the web because it saw what the web did to Windows and wants anything but that for iOS. An open, interoperable meta-platform would reduce Apple's power to tax, and we just can't have that, now can we? /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac This brings us to Google. Why in the world has Google been more than complicit in nerfing the web's chances on mobile? To answer this you need to grok that Google, like Apple and every other big company, is an agglomeration of small companies that happen to send their revenues to the same place, but probably don't have any love for each other. And Android comes from an acquisition: Danger. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac Think back with me to 2008 when Apple had launched the iPhone and Google had the struggling Android system. This was a multiple-miracle moment: because AT&T had an exclusive w/ Apple for US iPhone distribution, every telco and handset vendor was FREAKING OUT. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac If you were in the US in late '09 and consumed any mass media at all, you might still have dreams where Verizon flogs the Motorola Droid at you with teenage boy imagery. Real Lynx body spray territory. That happened on the back of this same of desperation. Giving up the fundamental software stack, and doing heavy co-marketing for a single vendor's hardware launch, was not where telcos wanted to be (spoiler: still isn't, which is why we can't have nice things). /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac For its part, the Android team played this freakout like a fiddle. In a truly ungoogly way, they demanded separate infrastructure, separate cafes, etc. etc. And they got it. There are lots of reasons to loathe Andy Rubin, but what he (and the Plus crew around the same time) helped do to the culture can't be overstated. He wanted a little kingdom to run like a petty tyrant, and he got it. Android was Not Google. /cc @chriscoyier @tomayac |
Gregory's Server
This was *also* a bridge strategy play, FWIW. Smartphones seem ubiquitious now, and they felt like a potential future at the time, but were anything but a high-volume proposition at the iOS launch. So having first-rate access to that bridge corpus of content and apps was a massive advantage in de-risking the early iPhone which, again, was a luxury novelty.
/cc @chriscoyier @tomayac