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Christine Lemmer-Webber

And of course once the door was open to did:web, the door was open to everything! Decentralization is now no longer a requirement for DIDs. You can make a centralized DID method and call it a "Decentralized Identifier" and you're right because it implements a spec named "Decentralized identifiers"

218 comments
Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

But it's ONLY EXPERTS IN DIDs WHO UNDERSTOOD THIS

Most users hear "Decentralized Identifiers" and they think they know what's being delivered, the distinction between the *spec* being called that and the *mechanism used* being centralized... you have to go digging to find that out

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

So did:web is not only useless, it misleads people about the problem domain entirely, but hey it's now the most broadly deployed DID method in the world, congrats everyone!

Speaking of centralized Decentralized Identifiers, did I mention that did:plc is centralized?

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

For that matter, where did the term did:plc come from? Early versions of "did:plc" documentation called it the "Placeholder" DID method, that's what it stands for, to motivate changing it later

Well the docs no longer say that, it now says "Public Ledger of Credentials"

Good backronymn, but...

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

did:plc is centralized, and that bothers me because once again, users think something is more decentralized than it is, because they're being *told* it's decentralized

The particular way in which did:plc is centralized doesn't bug me too much but once again, few users have read into this

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

If you read the documentation of did:plc, they're actually quite upfront about did:plc's centralization being non-ideal. That's good, I appreciate that. Again, you gotta dig though, and the name misleads (which is, to be fair, the original sin of the DID Working Group)

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

(aside: wow my eyes are getting tired from staring at my monitor while I recap of what was a 24 page blogpost, why do I do this to myself)

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Aside from being irritated about the name misleading, I don't mind the centralization of did:plc too much (other things, I am more concerned about, we'll get there)

There's one organization that can be queried via their API that keeps a definitive list of certificate and their updates

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

In theory, once a DID is registered with Bluesky, it cannot be altered by Bluesky, because a cryptographic update from the original key is necessary; it's a certificate chain, a good design

Bluesky can refuse to share did:plc documents or their updates, but it can't manufacture updates

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

This is pretty good tbh, it lowers the stakes a lot to have certificate chains

I love certificate chains, certificate chains are great

Honestly, having a centralized registry for them, it's not the best but it's not the worst (aside from that damn naming thing)

However...

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

There are some strange, strange things about did:plc that heightens the centralization concerns and, well

I'm not a cryptographer, but some of my good friends are cryptographers, etc etc. I got some... reactions to what is to follow

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

The first strange thing to me is that did:plc uses sha256 and, AFAICT, not sha256d (which is really just running sha256 again over the hash). Unless I am missing something? Am I wrong?

Maybe it's not a concern because of doc parsing but it's best practice to protect against length extension attacks

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

The next concerning thing is that did:plc truncates the hash to just *15 bytes* of entropy.

I'm... again I'm not a cryptographer, but why throw away all that delicious entropy? So the did fits in 32 characters? Weird choice, and it means collisions are cheaper

lizard appreciator replied to Christine

@cwebber is trashing some entropy useful to provide some of the properties @soatok mentions in his post from yesterday? soatok.blog/2024/11/21/key-tra

Kye Fox replied to lizard appreciator

@bonzoesc @cwebber @soatok I was just thinking this might be relevant

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

This is public information, I don't need to file a CVE to tell you about the truncation of entropy. I am, again, not a cryptographer. Maybe it's fine?

I do remember the Debian short IDs fiasco tho gwolf.org/2016/06/stop-it-with

Why not hold onto all the entropy you can get?

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

DIDs weren't meant to be seen by the user; cryptographic identifiers in general *shouldn't be*, they should be encapsulated in the UI.

We'll get to UI stuff in a bit.

I just don't understand this decision though, it just seems weird to me but maybe a cryptographer will tell me it's fine, actually

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

At any rate, I continue to not understand it, maybe it's fine, but it did play a part in that "Hijacking Bluesky Identities with a Malleable Deputy" blogpost, which is fascinating and, unlike me, is written by a Real Cryptographer (TM) da.vidbuchanan.co.uk/blog/hack

Good post btw

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

One way in which the truncation shows up in that blogpost which I thought was curious is that the attack involved generating a *longer* truncated hash

The fix ended up resulting in codifying the hash length: 24 characters, and no longer github.com/did-method-plc/did-

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

There's another thing about that blogpost that caught my attention. I will just quote it:

> However, there's one other factor that raises this from "a curiosity" to "a big problem": bsky.social uses the same rotationKeys for every account.

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

> This is an eyebrow-raising decision on its own; apparently the cloud HSM product they use does billing per key, so it would be prohibitively expensive to give each user their own. (I hear they're planning on transitioning from "cloud" to on-premise hosting, so maybe they'll get the chance to give each user their own keypair then?)

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Anyway that's the quote and presumably this must be changed. I haven't looked, but I can't imagine they're still doing this today (are they?) but the fact that only one key was ever used in production for expense purposes is a strange decision

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

At any rate, that decision was used to create a kinda confused deputy-ish attack, which is why it came up in the blogpost, and anyway, hi, I'm not a cryptographer, momentary reminder that I am not a cryptographer, but I have designed cryptographic certificate chains and I was pretty shocked by that

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

At any rate, one way or another, you can presumably use did:plc to move yourself from one server to another so in the interest of "credible exit" this is a good choice

Though, one might take a moment to ask: who controls the keys if you *do* want to move?

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Bluesky has identified, I'd say correctly even, that key management for users is an *incredibly* hard thing to do.

But the solution, once again, ends up pretty centralized: for all users on Bluesky's main servers at least, Bluesky generates and manages the keys for them.

Keiko replied to Christine

@cwebber That's why I run my own PDS. Then I can manage my own keys. I can't get away from their PLC though...

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

I am, once again, kinda sympathetic and kinda unsettled simultaneously.

- Sympathetic: key management *is* hard and we just don't have the UX answers to solve that, and Bluesky is once again trying to deliver to Twitter refugees
- Unsettled: it's centralized, but... there's something *more* troubling

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

The big promise here, the "credible exit" side of things is that for most users, the vision they have is that if Bluesky gets bought by a big evil company, no problem, move somewhere else

But for those same users, Bluesky still *controls their keys* and thus *controls their destiny*

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Regardless, Bluesky has this "your domain is your id!" thing, and that's pretty cool, the domain maps to your DID and your DID maps to your domain

Well, I'm not gonna get into this in detail here, I do on the blogpost if you wanna read it but, the cyclic dependency might be an actual cycle

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

tl;dr on that UX part:

- users only know domains, they don't know the DIDs
- turns out that's a phishing attack when those can change at any time
- if bsky.app ever goes down how do you actually know I *really* mapped to that name
- and a whole lot of "liveness" problems that enter there

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

in addition to this long-ass thread there is a long-ass article and if you care about things like "zooko's triangle" maybe read that version, the rest of y'all can move on we've got other stuff to cover here

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

It is time for TEA BREAK 2: THE REHEATENING

I will also go to the bathroom

TMI? If you've read this far into this weird thread I am already giving you too much info

=== TEA BREAK 2 ===

GeePawHill replied to Christine

@cwebber I'mo reply-guy you here: "Well, actually, tho I didn't understand everything, I got new bits and pieces I hadn't understood before, and I'm glad you wrote it."

Enjoy "The Reheatening". I heard the special effects were *wild*.

Berkubernetus replied to Christine

@cwebber Enjoying this thread, although afterwards it would be amazing if you'd roll it into a blog post.

Nelson Chu Pavlosky replied to Christine

@cwebber I think it's great that you're modeling for people that they should take breaks and take care of their bodies.

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

I have returned, with tea

I am still not reading notifications. Well, I have seen a few fly by on the fediverse which is blipping and blooping nonstop in the Mastodon UI so people are clearly reading it there

Bluesky says "30+". How big is the +?? I will resist temptation to look and assume "31"

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

"Where are we going with this Christine?"

Well you could have just read the blogpost but 3 more sections remain, we are approximately 2/3 there

I know, bear with me, what is left is:

- What should the fediverse do?
- Preparing for the organization as a future adversary
- Conclusions

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Yes, I changed the order of the remaining sections, not from the blogpost but from the last time I said what was left on this thread

pray I do not reorder them again

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Before we get into the next section, earlier I left an easter egg, which you could reply to and say "I found the easter egg" or something

Now you can put 2 eggs

I 2 was once an egg

(Look I specifically transitioned so I could never be accused of making dad jokes again so that does not qualify)

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to Christine

Alright you've heard enough critiques of Bluesky for a bit and I SAID I was gonna critique the fediverse and I am a WOMAN OF MY WORD

So let's get into it!

Canageek replied to Christine

@cwebber Would I be allowed to call them Mom jokes then?

Kye Fox replied to Christine

@cwebber The nice thing about a domain is, worst case scenario, it's at least an actual domain with a website, so people know where to find me yelling about whatever happened to wipe out my AT presence.

fontenot replied to Christine

@cwebber

Shouldn't this be 20 bytes? There are 32 characters, and each character is base32, or 5 bits. So 160 bits? Edit: nope, wrong.

I don't *think* there's a huge concern over this, because while maybe you could do a birthday collision attack in 80 bits, this wouldn't really get you much and wouldn't let you take over someone else's account. For that you'd need a pre-image attack on the whole 160 bits.

Edit: 120 bits pre-image, but I think the point stands?

*Also not a cryptographer!!*

Christine Lemmer-Webber replied to fontenot

@fontenot no because the 32 characters includes the "did:plc:"

Kye Fox replied to Christine

@cwebber @soatok thread entering your realm of expertise and interest

Btrinen replied to Christine

@cwebber I read that whole blog post this morning and am now re-reading via your handy thread in the hopes that the repetition helps me understand more. I think I’m starting to catch on a little.

Central Illumination Agency replied to Christine

@cwebber Good heavens, why is my brain misreading “did:plc” as “dick pic”?

Wait, on second thought, don’t tell me.

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