Gregory's ServerAnd yes "you can check that on Google easily" implies that Google can be trusted and it can't all the time. Ultimately at some point you do have to simply trust SOMEone, SOMEwhere. What I'm saying is that I don't trust a random person who bought a domain with "fedi" in the name and set up a directory
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 @darius or random people with servers—that issue of trust is what has held up some people I know from joining Mastodon   But also: this could be a mass harassment vector for journalists! Someone goes to trust.txt, scrapes every account there, and harasses them. But I do think that once you say in an official capacity "I am affiliated with [org]", you have to assume that anyone can find that info and can and will scrape it even if there isn't a directory available. idk. tough design space 
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@polymerwitch well, the fallback is a literal text file on the root of your domain. so someone could maintain that in excel and just export it as needed @darius I'm interested in this idea, could you elaborate on it? - What stops a malicious actor from spoofing a trust.txt and using that as validation in a similar way to phishing? ("verified by 'nytines' dot com", etc.) Would sites needs a whitelist of valid trust.txt sources? - On a related topic to the harassment vector point you had: how would you sell trust.txt to orgs that are interested in verification but do not normally want contact exposure for some personnel? (ex. directors and exec) (1/2) - you're right, spoofing is simply always going to be a threat where DNS is involved, but also anyone could spoof the service that I mention in the original post too the same way. "fedifeid" or whatnot. solutions that get around that are huge crypto-based things that are unlikely to play nice with IT infrastructure at say, news orgs (2/2) - it's a necessary tradeoff. if an exec wants to say "I am truly CEO of CorpX on LinkedIn" then the point there is to publicly broadcast that that is who they are. This is about linking public profile information to public institutions (at least in the journalism context here)  @darius i guess the advantage of an instance like journa.host (or even a nytimes-specific instance) is that they could be keep an eye out for attacks targeting newsrooms' entire trust.txt lists and possibly handle it faster or more efficiently. on the other hand, that might also overwhelm the moderation capabilities of a particular instance.  @darius To verify accounts associated with a public website (like newspapers or broadcasters): You could diminish the "harassment" aspect by having the "trust.txt" document actually be a list of *hashed* accounts. So when you want to verify whether an account is associated with a website, you can check this one-way (without being able to scrape the full trust.txt). @maxb huh? it's a website of a nonprofit called JournalList. the link is to a pdf. they don't know anything about federation. this is just a specification |
@darius hang on lemme scroll through all 4000 words of https://book.keybase.io/guides/proof-integration-guide