… so that you can have the basic OS image, layers of extensions on top, and finally app images as payload – all shipped as DDIs with strongest cryptographic guarantees.
So, while systemd has been strong on DDIs already, there's one thing we did *not* provide until v256: the ability to work with DDIs from unprivileged code. Mounting file systems is after all a privileged operation on its lowest level and (with some exceptions) not accessible to unprivileged users.
And that for a reason: kernel file system developers mostly do not consider attacks on the kernel through rogue file system images a security vulnerability. File systems are very complex data structures after all, and guaranteeing that a rogue fs image can't exploit the kernel (or just guarantee algorithmic boundedness) is very very hard. Moreover, file systems can carry dangerous things, such as SUID and SGID binaries, or executables with file system capabilities set.