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Codeberg.org

If there was malicious code in a legitimate project hosted on #codeberg, would we remove access to it, including for security researchers?

Short: No!

We are considering how to prevent fetching malicious code by accident, though.

In any case, we are open to collaborating with security researchers. Interested? Help us build a malware hunting team: codeberg.org/Codeberg/Contribu

Background: #GitHub locked access to source code of xz, which was background of active investigation from the community.

5 comments
Codeberg.org

To people looking for an archive of the XZ code, you might want to check out tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/ which links to git.tukaani.org/. GitHub is not the only source of truth, although meta information about the Pull Requests is locked in to this silo.

Olfred

@Codeberg Many thanks for your work on openess. It's another proof that git history is not sufficient and we cannot tolerate a locked silo like Github. PR, issues, comments and everything else are an essential part of the repository, the code is not enough.

minecraftchest1

@Codeberg One idea I have for preventing accidental fetches of malicious code would be to prevent access through the primary domain, and require the use of a seperate (sub)domain such as [caution.codeberg.org](caution.codeberg.org), or [codeberg-caution.org](codeberg-caution.org). Weither this is done throgh a seperate instance it is cloned to, or via special handeling in the forejo would be up to debate.

Daniel Parks

@Codeberg I think it makes sense to block vanilla git clone and the download buttons to prevent people from accidentally packaging or installing it.
I think what I would do is something like requiring the use of a special URL in order for clones to succeed.

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