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OONI

โ€ผ๏ธ Russia blocked access to one of our platforms, OONI Explorer: a large open dataset on internet censorship worldwide
explorer.ooni.org

OONI Explorer documents the blocking of OONI Explorer in #Russia. ๐Ÿ™

Learn more through our latest report: ooni.org/post/2024-russia-bloc

๐Ÿงต

#ooni #censorship #opendata

OONI

On 11th September 2024, we received an email from Roskomnadzor, informing us of their decision to block access to OONI Explorer.

On the same day, OONI data shows that ISPs in #Russia started implementing the block.

Learn more: ooni.org/post/2024-russia-bloc

#ooni #censorship #opendata

OONI

๐Ÿ”ด As of 24th November 2023, OONI data suggests that some ISPs in #Guinea started blocking access to WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.

The blocks appear to be implemented by means of TLS interference.

๐Ÿ™ OONI data: explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?pr

The blocking of YouTube is further suggested by Google traffic data, which shows a drop in YouTube traffic originating from Guinea over the last few days: transparencyreport.google.com/

๐Ÿ”ด As of 24th November 2023, OONI data suggests that some ISPs in #Guinea started blocking access to WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube.

The blocks appear to be implemented by means of TLS interference.

๐Ÿ™ OONI data: explorer.ooni.org/chart/mat?pr

Screenshot of OONI Explorer chart showing that Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and YouTube were inaccessible in Guinea since 24th November
OONI

If you're in #Guinea, you can contribute measurements by running OONI Probe: ooni.org/install/ ๐Ÿ™

Please ensure your VPN is turned off when running OONI Probe to help contribute more accurate measurements. ๐Ÿ™
ooni.org/about/risks

OONI Probe installation page screenshot
OONI

๐Ÿ”ด Measuring HTTP/3 censorship with OONI Probe
ooni.org/post/2022-http3-measu

In collaboration with Kathrin Elmenhorst, we discovered that the deployment of HTTP/3 censorship varies significantly in #China, #Iran, #India & #Kazakhstan.

While some censors do not filter HTTP/3 traffic at all and some collaterally block HTTP/3 hosts, we uncovered HTTP/3-targeting censorship in Iran.

Read Kathrin's summary of findings to learn more! โœจ

๐Ÿ”ด Measuring HTTP/3 censorship with OONI Probe
ooni.org/post/2022-http3-measu

In collaboration with Kathrin Elmenhorst, we discovered that the deployment of HTTP/3 censorship varies significantly in #China, #Iran, #India & #Kazakhstan.

While some censors do not filter HTTP/3 traffic at all and some collaterally block HTTP/3 hosts, we uncovered HTTP/3-targeting censorship in Iran.

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