@yarmo Honestly, why even do they have access to that directory (or to any other file that doesn't belong to the application, and wasn't explicitly selected by a user), where also all the passwords and hashes and such are stored?
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CMDR Yojimbosan UTC+(12|13)
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@yojimbo @yarmo I've heard somewhere that originally UNIX was not supposed to have the open() call exposed to user applications -- you could only manipulate the files you got as stdin, stdout and stderr. Then you could add an open() call that required user interaction to select the file -- handled by the system, not the program. It would solve a lot of problems. Unfortunately, the UNIX security focused on protecting the mainframe from the students that used it, not them from each other.
CMDR Yojimbosan UTC+(12|13)
@rodolphe @deshipu @yarmo Cool, I hadn't seen SubgraphOS before. My first thought is that it's combining security-from-applications with anonymity-from-the-internet using Tor, and I'd rather concentrate on the app security end. https://github.com/subgraph/oz/wiki/Oz-Technical-Details looks like that piece, I'll enjoy reading about it ... |
@deshipu @yarmo The 'app store' or mobile-phone-os approach seems like its catching on.
We need a desktop OS that treats non-core software like a potential threat, rather than an obviously-trusted insider.