Gregory's ServerJust FTR. The backdoor code was inserted only under very specific circumstances in the build process. Once the problem was identified and after initial analysis made it clear how it worked, immediate action was taken in a coordinated fashion. Affected builds/packages were removed, update systems for affected distributions started delivering forced downgrades. Users of these systems were informed. This all happened in public, in transparent and open ways. All in the first 24 hours. I tip my hat.
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@jwildeboer even more, 1000 eyes are now focussing on the wound, looking for damages and other infections. 1000 eyes that would otherwise do other things are focussing on the one wound, so it can heal. Once a problem has been identified, the self-healing capabilities are typically given. This is the resilience that is needed for survival. And it is there. That's the open-source spirit, and it is awesome π€π  For the impact on #Fedora, please follow the developing story at https://fedoramagazine.org/cve-2024-3094-security-alert-f40-rawhide/ - That's the transparency and openness I am talking about. I will let this tread rest for a while, as IMHO (In My Humble Opinion) everything we know ATM (At This Moment) is documented in the links I provided and besides making sure our machines have been updated (more precise: downgraded the xz package) there is not much we can do. I will NOT participate in speculations and potentially harmful spreading of rumours. And now I will be taking care of other things on this beautiful day. Thank you all for taking your time to read and comment!  @jwildeboer yesβ¦ but. Iβm now wondering if there are other instances we havenβt caught, or caught yet. Seems optimistic to assume that weβve spotted a solitary instance of a very sophisticated approach to sneaking in back doors. At a minimum, it might be time to revisit the practice of key signing parties and doing more to vet contributors. @jzb What I am trying to say is that there are two sides here. Solving and cleaning up after it happened is #1. That is what I am talking about. #2, what you mention, is how to harden the FOSS ecosystem proactively to reduce the risk of stuff "hiding in plain sight" in FOSS. That's a far wider field with many more unknowns. We just shouldn't mix the two things because that leads to open ending arguments and not to solutions, IMHO.  @jwildeboer Absolutely. From identifying the problem to having the fix on my computer, drawn from the official (Arch) repo, it took just about 3 hours. That's insanely fast. |
Now the mess is being cleaned up. AFAICS this exploit was NOT used in the wild by bad actors. So it wasn't even a 0day. The damage is limited, contained and being taken care of. In a coordinated way, across communities, companies and more organisations. Because we were prepared for the aftermath. We have learned form Heartbleed and other events. Our FOSS immune system works. And will learn from this incident. Peace.